

A short impossibility proof of Quantum Bit Commitment

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Bit commitment protocols, whose security is based on the laws of quantum mechanics alone, are generally held to be impossible on the basis of a concealment-bindingness tradeoff [1, 2]. A strengthened and explicit impossibility proof has been given in Ref. [3] in the Heisenberg picture and in a C^* -algebraic framework, considering all conceivable protocols in which both classical and quantum information are exchanged. In the present paper we provide a new impossibility proof in the Schrödinger picture, greatly simplifying the classification of protocols and strategies using the mathematical formulation in terms of quantum combs [4], with each single-party strategy represented by a *conditional comb*. We prove that assuming a stronger notion of concealment—worst-case over the classical information histories—allows Alice’s cheat to pass also the worst-case Bob’s test. The present approach allows us to restate the concealment-bindingness tradeoff in terms of the continuity of dilations of probabilistic quantum combs with respect to the comb-discriminability distance.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Bit commitment involves two mistrustful parties—Alice and Bob—of which Alice submits to Bob a piece of evidence that he will use to confirm a bit value that she will later reveal, whereas Bob cannot determine the bit value from the evidence alone. A good bit commitment protocol should be simultaneously *concealing* and *binding*, namely the evidence should be submitted to Bob in such a way that he has (almost) no chance to identify the committed bit value before Alice later decodes it for him, whereas Alice has (almost) no way of changing the value of the committed bit once she has submitted the evidence. In the easiest example to illustrate bit commitment, Alice writes the bit down on a piece of paper, which is then locked in a safe and sent to Bob, whereas Alice keeps the key. At a later time, she will unveil the bit by handing over the key to Bob. However, Bob may be able to open the safe in the meantime, and this scheme is in principle insecure. Yet all bit commitment schemes currently used rely on strongboxes and keys made of computations that are (supposedly) hard to perform (see Ref. [3] for a list of references), and cryptographers have long known that bit commitment (like any other interesting two-party cryptographic primitive) cannot be securely implemented with classical information [5].

Besides having immediate practical applications, bit commitment is also a very powerful cryptographic primitive. Conceived by Blum [6] as a building block for secure coin tossing, it also allows to implement secure oblivious transfer [7, 8, 9], which, in turn, is sufficient to establish secure two-party computation [5, 10].

It has therefore been a long-time challenge for quantum cryptographers to find *unconditionally secure* quantum bit commitment protocols, in which—very much in parallel to quantum key distribution [11, 12]—security is guaranteed by the laws of quantum physics alone.

The first quantum bit commitment protocol appeared in the famous Bennett and Brassard 1984 quantum cryptography paper [11], in a version for implementing coin tossing. However, they also proved that Alice can cheat using EPR correlations, by which she can unveil either bit at the opening stage by measuring in the appropriate basis a particle entangled with the one encoding the bit, whereas Bob has no way to detect the attack. Subsequent proposals for bit commitment schemes tried to evade this type of attack, *e.g.* in the protocol of Ref. [13] which for a while was generally accepted to be unconditionally secure.

In 1996 Lo and Chau [1], and Mayers [2] realized that all previously proposed bit commitment protocols were vulnerable to a generalized version of the EPR attack that renders the BB84 proposal insecure, a result that they slightly extended to cover quantum bit commitment protocols in general. Their basic argument is the following. At the end of the commitment phase, Bob will hold one out of two quantum states ϱ_k as proof of Alice’s commitment to the bit value $k \in \{0, 1\}$. Alice holds its purification ψ_k , which she will later pass on to Bob to

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unveil. For the protocol to be concealing, the two states ϱ_k should be (almost) indistinguishable, $\varrho_0 \approx \varrho_1$. But Uhlmann's theorem [14] then implies the existence of a unitary transformation U that (nearly) rotates the purification of ϱ_0 into the purification of ϱ_1 . Since U is localized on the purifying system only, which is entirely under Alice's control, Lo-Chau-Mayers argue that Alice can switch at will between the two states, and is not in any way bound to her commitment. As a consequence, any concealing bit commitment protocol is argued to be necessarily non-binding (these results still hold true when both parties are restricted by superselection rules [15]). So while the proposed quantum bit commitment protocols offer good practical security on the grounds that Alice's EPR attack is hard to perform with current technology, none of them is unconditionally secure.

Starting from 2000 the Lo-Chau-Mayers no-go theorem [1, 2] has been continually challenged by Yuen and others [16, 17, 18], arguing that the impossibility proof of Ref. [1] does not exhaust all conceivable quantum bit commitment protocols, whereas it is still unclear if Mayer's framework [2] is complete. Several protocols have been proposed and claimed to circumvent the no-go theorem [16]. These protocols seek to strengthen Bob's position with the help of 'secret parameters' or 'anonymous states', so that Alice lacks some information needed to cheat successfully: while Uhlmann's theorem would still imply the existence of a unitary cheating transformation as described above, this transformation might be unknown to Alice.

The above attempts to build up a secure quantum bit commitment protocol have motivated the thorough analysis of Ref. [3], which provided a strengthened and explicit impossibility proof exhausting all conceivable protocols in which classical and quantum information is exchanged between two parties, including the possibility of protocol aborts and resets. The proof [3] encompasses protocols even with unbounded number of communication rounds (it is only required that the expected number of rounds is finite), and with quantum systems on infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. However, the considerable length of the proof in Ref. [3] makes it still hard to follow (see *e.g.* comments in Ref. [17]), lacking a synthetic intuition of the impossibility proof.

The debate can be only settled with an appropriate formulation of the problem, which is sufficiently powerful to include all possible protocols in a single simple mathematical object, thus leaving no shadow of doubt on the completeness of the protocol classification. Once the mathematical formulation of all protocols is settled, then the impossibility statement becomes just a mathematical theorem. In this paper we will first see that the appropriate notion to describe all individual strategies in a purely quantum protocol is the *quantum comb*. The quantum comb generalizes the notion of quantum operation of Kraus [19], and has been originally introduced in Ref. [4] to describe quantum *circuit boards*, where inputs and outputs are not just quantum states, but quan-

tum operations themselves. Since quantum combs are in one-to-one correspondence with sequences of quantum operations [4, 20], a quantum comb is suited to represent the sequence of moves performed by a party in a multi-round quantum protocol. Indeed, the same mathematical structure of quantum combs has been recognized by Gutoski and Watrous in Ref. [21] as the appropriate formulation of multi-round quantum games. In order to treat protocols that involve both quantum and classical communication, we will then extend this framework by introducing the concept of *conditional comb*, which describes a computing network that is able to sequentially process both quantum and classical information.

Examples of combs are represented diagrammatically in Fig. 1. For a purely quantum comb, each line entering or exiting a tooth of the comb represents a quantum system. For a conditional comb, each line represents a hybrid quantum-classical system, accounting also for classical information exchanged at each step. In a two-party protocol, a comb represents a single-party strategy, with each tooth of the comb representing the move performed by the party at some turn. Subsequent turns are represented by subsequent teeth, from left to right. The output of the multi-round protocol is given by two combs interlaced as in Fig. 2—the upper Bob's, the lower Alice's. The exchange of quantum-classical systems can be mathematically described in a C^* -algebraic representation of a deterministic comb, or, equivalently, by treating the conditional comb as a collection of (purely quantum) probabilistic combs, each of them being labeled by a particular history of classical communication. In this paper, we will choose the second point of view, which avoids using the C^* -algebraic framework, with the need, however, of considering collections of probabilistic quantum combs, accounting for the classical information coming from measurements.




FIG. 1: Diagrammatic representation of quantum combs. For a quantum comb each line entering or exiting a tooth represents a quantum system, while for a conditional comb it represents a hybrid quantum-classical system. A quantum operation (the box on the left upper corner) is a special case of quantum comb with a single tooth.

A protocol assigns the set of allowed strategies, i.e. the set of allowed conditional combs, along with the pertaining input-output structure regulating the exchange of quantum and classical information. As already mentioned, a conditional comb is a collection of probabilistic quantum combs, each of them representing the sequence of single-party moves associated to a particular history of classical communication. In a general protocol, some histories will lead to a successful commitment, while some other will possibly lead to an *abort*, in which the two parties irrevocably give up, excluding any further com-

munication (if the protocol is restarted, then the concatenation of the two sequences can be regarded as part of a new longer protocol with possible *resets*). Accordingly, we will consider histories from the beginning to the end of the commitment (which can be either successful or not), *i.e.* excluding the opening. Each tooth of a comb corresponds to a single turn of the protocol, and, in the case of successful commitment, the last tooth represents the last turn before the opening.

For histories that end in a successful commitment, in the opening Alice will send to Bob a classical message along with a set of ancillae prescribed by the protocol, and Bob will perform a suitable joint measurement on all quantum systems available to him, as in Fig. 2. The combination of Bob’s comb (up to the opening) with the final measurement at the opening is itself a special case of quantum comb—the so-called *quantum tester*—whose output is the committed bit value. In this framework, Alice’s comb plays the role of a “state” encoding the bit value, whereas Bob’s tester plays the role of a “POVM” for binary discrimination. Such binary discrimination—prescribed by the protocol at its end—should not be confused with Bob’s attempts to discriminate Alice’s strategies before the opening. We will see that the fact that the protocol has many rounds actually can help Bob in discriminating between different Alice’s strategies. Thus, the probability of Bob cheating—which in a protocol with a single Bob-Alice-Bob round would be represented by the CB-norm distance between Alice’s channels—here is replaced by the *comb distance*[22], which is typically larger than the CB-norm, since Bob can exploit the memory structure of Alice’s strategy.




FIG. 2: A two-party protocol in which classical and quantum information are exchanged assigns the set of allowed conditional combs, along with the pertaining input-output structure. A conditional comb is a collection of quantum combs labeled by histories of classical communication, each quantum comb representing a specific sequence of single-party moves for a particular classical history. Each tooth of a comb corresponds to a single turn of the protocol, the last one representing the last turn in the commitment phase. For histories ending in a successful commitment, at the opening Bob performs a joint measurement on all systems available to him. Combining Bob’s comb before the opening with this final measurement yields a special case of quantum comb—the so-called *quantum tester*—whose output is the committed bit value. In this framework, Alice’s comb plays the role of a “state” encoding the bit value, whereas Bob’s tester plays the role of a “POVM” for binary discrimination. Such binary discrimination—prescribed by the protocol at its end—should not be confused with Bob’s attempts to discriminate Alice’s strategies before the opening.

In the following we will consider the concealment-

bindingness tradeoff for any possible history of classical information exchanged within the protocol. This will allow us to restate the tradeoff in terms of a mathematical theorem assessing the continuity of dilations of probabilistic quantum combs in terms of the comb discriminability-distance. The dilation theorem states that any probabilistic comb can be dilated to a sequence of single-Kraus quantum operations, upon introducing some additional ancillae. As a consequence, the impossibility proof will run essentially as follows. At the end of the commitment phase, two possible Alice’s strategies for the bit values 0 and 1, respectively, are (almost) indistinguishable to Bob, who lacks the quantum information encoded in Alice’s ancillae. Instead, at the opening, the two dilated strategies of Alice corresponding to the two values of the committed bit are (almost) perfectly discriminable. As a consequence of indistinguishability up to the opening phase, Alice can choose between the two strategies by performing a unitary transformation on the ancilla in the last tooth of her comb. Therefore, one has (almost) perfect opening, and, at the same time, Alice can cheat perfectly. The concealment-bindingness tradeoff is thus reduced to the continuity of the dilation of probabilistic combs in terms of their discriminability-distance. In the present paper we will restrict to finite-dimensional protocols, with finite-number of rounds. The last assumption does not introduce any practical limitation, since, in the real world one needs to put a bound anyway to the lapse of time needed for the commitment. We will anyway discuss also protocols with unbounded number of rounds in the concluding section.

Before starting the main sections of the paper, we compare here the present approach with that of the previous impossibility proof in Ref. [27]. Ref. [27] treats the strategies as the preparation of a quantum register, and classical and quantum communications are described in the Heisenberg picture in the unified framework of C^* -algebras. In the present approach the C^* -algebraic framework is avoided, by treating classical histories as labels for sequences of quantum operations in the Schrödinger picture, and strategies are identified with conditional quantum combs, which provide a direct mathematical formulation. At this level, the differences are only in the mathematical language, but two approaches are substantially equivalent. There are, however, conceptual differences, in which the two approaches sensibly differ. The most relevant difference is the notion of security, which in the present treatment is taken at the strongest level, *i.e.* worst-case over all classical histories, whereas in Ref. [27] security was defined in average. The present security notion is cryptographically the strongest, corresponding to a priceless commitment bit. Another important difference between the present approach and that of Ref. [27] is a more general impossibility proof, in which one can restrict the set of possible Bob’s operations to a set closed under dilations. In other words, we assume that Bob is able to keep pure his quantum information and to perform arbitrary quan-

tum operations on his ancillae, whereas his operations on the quantum systems exchanged during the commitment can be restricted by arbitrary constraints. This makes the impossibility proof more general, including *e.g.* the case of a Bob constrained by a checking Alice.

The paper is organized as follows. In section II we review the definition and the main features of a quantum protocol for bit commitment, and define what a successful bit commitment protocol would have to achieve. In Section III we will briefly recall the prerequisites about quantum combs, including the notion of quantum tester, the discriminability-distance, the dilation of combs, and the notion of conditional comb. The most important result of the section is the dilation theorem for quantum combs, along with a continuity theorem in terms of the discriminability-distance. In Section IV we present the mathematical formulation of bit commitment in terms of quantum combs, and state the impossibility proof for protocols with bounded and unbounded number of rounds of communication. The analysis will be based solely on the principles of quantum mechanics, including classical physics, but not including relativistic constraints, which are known to facilitate secure bit commitment [23, 24]. Section VI concludes the paper with some comments on the main results.

II. WHAT IS A PROTOCOL

A protocol regulates the exchange of messages between participants, defining what are the honest strategies that they can adopt, so that at every stage it is clear what type of message is expected from the participants, although, of course, their content is not fixed. The expected message types can be either classical or quantum or a combination thereof. The number of classical states and the dimension of the Hilbert spaces at a given step can depend on the previously generated classical information.

A. Phases of the Protocol

In any bit commitment protocol, we can distinguish two main phases. The first is the *commitment phase*, in which Alice and Bob exchange classical and quantum messages in order to commit the bit. Eventually, this phase can end either with a successful commitment, or with an abort, in which the two parties irrevocably give up the purpose of committing the bit (of course, in a well-designed protocol, if both parties are honest the probability of abort should be vanishingly small). If no abort took place, the bit value is considered to be committed to Bob but, supposedly, concealed from him. Since bit commitment is a two-party protocol and trusted third parties are not allowed, the starting state necessarily has to be originated by one of the two parties (see also Fig. 3). Moreover, since we can always include in the protocol null steps (in which no information, classical or quantum,




FIG. 3: The bit commitment protocol is two-party only, and trusted third parties are not allowed. Here in figure rounded portions represent examples of trusted third parties, *e.g.* the left one could be a trusted joint state, and the right one a trusted joint measurement. Another example of third party could be a third comb interlaced with Alice's and Bob's.

is exchanged), without loss of generality, we can restrict our attention to protocols that are started by Bob.

The second phase is the *opening phase*. In the case of abort during the commitment, this is just a null step, whereas, in the case of successful commitment, at the opening Alice will send to Bob some classical or quantum information in order to reveal the bit value. Taking both Alice's message and his own (classical and quantum) records, Bob will then perform a suitable *verification measurement*. His measurement will result in either a successful readout of the committed bit, or in a failure, *e.g.* due to the detection of an attempted cheat. Again, in a well-designed protocol the probability of failure should be vanishingly small.

B. Conditions on Successful Protocols

In the following we will denote by a_0 and a_1 two honest strategies corresponding to the two bit values 0 and 1, respectively. We call a protocol ε -concealing if, conditionally on any history of classical communication, Bob cannot distinguish between the strategies a_0 and a_1 (up to an error ε) before Alice opens the commitment. In general, of course, the probability of a given history of classical communication depends on whether Alice chooses a_0 or a_1 . Since this dependence can be exploited by Bob to infer the bit value, we must require that, no matter what strategy b Bob uses, the conditional probability of a_0 given history s never differs from the probability of a_1 given history s by more than ε . Note that this requirement must be satisfied even by histories that end up in an abort, otherwise, by the sole fact that the protocol aborted Bob could reliably infer the value of the bit.

We say that an Alice's strategy a^\sharp is δ -close to a if, conditionally on any history of classical communication, Bob cannot distinguish a from a^\sharp (up to an error δ) at any time, including the opening phase. Given two honest strategies a_0 and a_1 , a δ -cheating is a pair of strategies a_0^\sharp and a_1^\sharp , with the properties that *i)* a_i^\sharp is δ -close to a_i for $i = 0, 1$ and *ii)* Alice can turn a_0^\sharp into a_1^\sharp with a local operation on her ancillae after the end of the commitment

phase. In other words, the strategies a_0^\sharp and a_1^\sharp are the same throughout the commitment phase, and differ only by a local operation carried out before the opening. If no δ -cheating strategy exists for Alice, we call the protocol δ -binding.

III. PREREQUISITES ON QUANTUM COMBS

Here we briefly summarize the formalism of quantum combs and few related results. In addition, this section contains the core result of this paper, namely the continuity theorem for the dilation of probabilistic quantum combs in terms of their discriminability-distance.

A. Choi-Jamiołkowski operators and link product

A quantum operation (trace non-increasing CP-map) \mathcal{C} from states on \mathcal{H}_i to states on \mathcal{H}_j is described by its Choi-Jamiołkowski operator

$$C = (\mathcal{C} \otimes \mathcal{I}_i)(|I_i\rangle\rangle\langle\langle I_i|) \in \text{Lin}(\mathcal{H}_j \otimes \mathcal{H}_i), \quad (1)$$

where \mathcal{I}_i is the identity map on \mathcal{H}_i , and $|I_i\rangle\rangle \in \mathcal{H}_i^{\otimes 2}$ is the maximally entangled vector $|I_i\rangle\rangle = \sum_n |n\rangle|n\rangle$, $\{|n\rangle\}$ orthonormal basis for \mathcal{H}_i . By the Choi's theorem, the map \mathcal{C} is CP if and only if the Choi-Jamiołkowski operator is positive (semidefinite). In general, we will often exploit the one-to-one correspondence between bipartite states in $|F\rangle\rangle \in \mathcal{H}_j \otimes \mathcal{H}_i$ and operators F from \mathcal{H}_i to \mathcal{H}_j given by

$$|F\rangle\rangle = (F \otimes I_i)|I_i\rangle\rangle, \quad (2)$$

and the useful relation

$$(F \otimes I_i)|I_i\rangle\rangle = (I_j \otimes F^\tau)|I_j\rangle\rangle, \quad (3)$$

F^τ denoting the transposed of F with respect to the orthonormal basis $\{|n\rangle\}$. If \mathcal{C} is a quantum operation from \mathcal{H}_i to \mathcal{H}_j and \mathcal{D} is a quantum operation from \mathcal{H}_j to \mathcal{H}_k , the Choi-Jamiołkowski operator of the quantum operation $\mathcal{D}\mathcal{C}$, from \mathcal{H}_i to \mathcal{H}_k , resulting from the connection of \mathcal{C} and \mathcal{D} is given by the *link product* [4]

$$D * C := \text{Tr}_j[(D \otimes I_i)(I_k \otimes C^{\tau_j})], \quad (4)$$

Tr_j and τ_j denoting partial trace and partial transpose on \mathcal{H}_j , respectively. A quantum operation \mathcal{C} is trace-preserving (*i.e.* it is a channel) if and only if it satisfies the normalization condition

$$I_j * C \equiv \text{Tr}_j[C] = I_i. \quad (5)$$

Viewing quantum states as a special kind of channels (with one-dimensional input space), Eq. (4) yields

$$\mathcal{C}(\rho) = C * \rho = \text{Tr}_i[C(I_j \otimes \rho^\tau)]. \quad (6)$$

B. Quantum combs

A quantum comb describes a sequential network of N quantum operations with memory $(\mathcal{C}_k)_{k=0}^{N-1}$, with $N-1$ open slots in which variable quantum operations can be inserted, as in Fig. 4. The comb is in one-to-one




FIG. 4: N -comb: sequential network of N quantum operations with memory. The network contains input and output systems (free wires in the diagram), as well as internal memories (wires connecting the boxes).

correspondence with the the Choi-Jamiołkowski operator R of the network, which can be computed as the link product of the Choi-Jamiołkowski operators $(C_k)_{k=0}^{N-1}$:

$$R := C_{N-1} * \dots * C_0. \quad (7)$$

Labelling the input (output) spaces of \mathcal{C}_k as \mathcal{H}_{2k} (\mathcal{H}_{2k+1}), we have that R is a non-negative operator on $\mathcal{K} := \bigotimes_{j=0}^{2N-1} \mathcal{H}_j$.

For networks of channels the operator R has to satisfy the recursive normalization condition [4, 21]

$$\text{Tr}_{2k-1}[R^{(k)}] = I_{2k-2} \otimes R^{(k-1)} \quad k = 1, \dots, N \quad (8)$$

where $R^{(N)} := R$, $R^{(k)} \in \text{Lin}\left(\bigotimes_{j=0}^{2k-1} \mathcal{H}_j\right)$, and $R^{(0)} = 1$. Moreover, one has the characterization [4, 20]

Theorem 1 *Any positive operator R satisfying Eq. (8) is the Choi-Jamiołkowski operator of a sequential network of N channels. Any positive operator R' such that $R' \leq R$ is the Choi-Jamiołkowski operator of a sequential network of N quantum operations.*

We call a quantum comb R satisfying Eq. (8) *deterministic*, and a comb $R' \leq R$ *probabilistic*.

C. Dilation of quantum combs

By Stinespring-Kraus-Ozawa theorem[19, 25, 26], any quantum operation \mathcal{C} from states on \mathcal{H}_i to \mathcal{H}_j can be dilated to an isometric map followed by a post-selection on an ancilla

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{C}(\rho) &= \text{Tr}_A[(I \otimes P_A)V\rho V^\dagger] \\ &= \text{Tr}_A[K\rho K^\dagger] \quad K = (I \otimes P_A)V, \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

with V isometry from \mathcal{H}_i to $\mathcal{H}_j \otimes \mathcal{H}_A$, and P_A orthogonal projector on a subspace of the ancilla space \mathcal{H}_A .

We refer to the single-Kraus map

$$\tilde{\mathcal{E}}(\rho) := K\rho K^\dagger \quad (10)$$

as to a *dilation* of the quantum operation \mathcal{E} . In terms of Choi-Jamiołkowski operators, one has

$$C = \text{Tr}_A[\tilde{C}] \in \text{Lin}(\mathcal{H}_j \otimes \mathcal{H}_i), \quad (11)$$

where $\tilde{C} = |K\rangle\rangle\langle\langle K|$ is the Choi-Jamiołkowski operator of the dilation. A (minimal) dilation of the quantum operation \mathcal{E} has ancilla space $\mathcal{H}_A \simeq \text{Supp}(C) \subseteq \mathcal{H}_j \otimes \mathcal{H}_i := \mathcal{H}_{ij}$, and Choi-Jamiołkowski operator

$$\tilde{C} = |C^{\frac{1}{2}}\rangle\rangle\langle\langle C^{\frac{1}{2}}| \in \text{Lin}(\mathcal{H}_{ij} \otimes \mathcal{H}_A). \quad (12)$$

In particular, when the quantum operation is a quantum channel also its dilation is a channel— $\tilde{\mathcal{E}}(\rho) = V\rho V^\dagger$, V isometry—with the Choi-Jamiołkowski operator satisfying the normalization condition $\text{Tr}_{A,j}[\tilde{C}] = I_i$.

Since a quantum comb $R \in \text{Lin}(\mathcal{K})$ with $\mathcal{K} = \bigotimes_{j=0}^{2N-1} \mathcal{H}_j$ represents a sequential network of quantum operations, one can always obtain a dilation of the comb by dilating each quantum operation in the network. A useful dilation of R is given by

$$\tilde{R} = |R^{\frac{1}{2}}\rangle\rangle\langle\langle R^{\frac{1}{2}}| \in \text{Lin}(\mathcal{K} \otimes \mathcal{H}_A), \quad (13)$$

where $\mathcal{H}_A \simeq \text{Supp}(R) \subseteq \mathcal{K}$. The dilation \tilde{R} has the following interpretation: \tilde{R} is a quantum comb acting on the Hilbert spaces $(\tilde{\mathcal{H}}_j)_{j=0}^{2N-1}$, where $\tilde{\mathcal{H}}_{2N-1} := \mathcal{H}_{2N-1} \otimes \mathcal{H}_A$, and $\tilde{\mathcal{H}}_k = \mathcal{H}_k$ for $k < 2N-1$. Therefore, by Theorem 1 it represents a sequence of N quantum operations with memory $(\tilde{\mathcal{E}}_k)_{k=0}^{N-1}$. Tracing out the ancilla space \mathcal{H}_A in the output $\tilde{\mathcal{H}}_{2N-1} = \mathcal{H}_{2N-1} \otimes \mathcal{H}_A$ of the last quantum operation $\tilde{\mathcal{E}}_{N-1}$, one then obtains back the original network

$$R = \text{Tr}_A[\tilde{R}]. \quad (14)$$

Note that only the ancilla space \mathcal{H}_A in the output of the last quantum operation appears in the dilation \tilde{R} .

For quantum states it is known that the purification is unique up to partial isometries on the ancilla spaces. For quantum combs one has the straightforward extension:

Proposition 1 *Let $R \in \text{Lin}(\mathcal{K})$, $\mathcal{K} = \bigotimes_{j=0}^{2N-1} \mathcal{H}_j$ be a quantum comb. Let $\tilde{R} \in \text{Lin}(\mathcal{K} \otimes \mathcal{H}_A)$ and $\tilde{R}' \in \text{Lin}(\mathcal{K} \otimes \mathcal{H}_{A'})$ be two dilations of R , i.e. \tilde{R} and \tilde{R}' are both non-negative rank-one operators such that*

$$\text{Tr}_A[\tilde{R}] = \text{Tr}_{A'}[\tilde{R}']. \quad (15)$$

Then there exists a partial isometry W from \mathcal{H}_A to $\mathcal{H}_{A'}$ such that

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{R}' &= (I \otimes W)\tilde{R}(I \otimes W^\dagger), \\ \tilde{R} &= (I \otimes W^\dagger)\tilde{R}'(I \otimes W), \end{aligned} \quad (16)$$

I denoting the identity on \mathcal{K} .

For the application to bit commitment it is crucial to note that all dilations of a comb can be obtained by just applying a partial isometry W on the *last output system*. An obvious consequence of the above fact is:

Corollary 1 *Let $R \in \text{Lin}(\mathcal{K})$, $\mathcal{K} = \bigotimes_{j=0}^{2N-1} \mathcal{H}_j$ be a quantum comb. If $\tilde{R} \in \text{Lin}(\mathcal{K} \otimes \mathcal{H}_A)$ and $\tilde{R}' \in \text{Lin}(\mathcal{K} \otimes \mathcal{H}_{A'})$ are two dilations of R , then there exist two quantum channels \mathcal{E} from states on \mathcal{H}_A to states on $\mathcal{H}_{A'}$ and \mathcal{F} from states on $\mathcal{H}_{A'}$ to states on \mathcal{H}_A such that*

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{R}' &= (\mathcal{I} \otimes \mathcal{E})(\tilde{R}) = E * \tilde{R} \\ \tilde{R} &= (\mathcal{I} \otimes \mathcal{F})(\tilde{R}') = F * \tilde{R}', \end{aligned} \quad (17)$$

\mathcal{I} denoting the identity map on \mathcal{K} , and E and F being the Choi-Jamiołkowski operators of the channels \mathcal{E} and \mathcal{F} , respectively.

This means that one can switch from one dilation to another just by performing some physical transformation on the ancilla in output of the last quantum operation of the comb. As we will see in the following, in a bit commitment protocol this implies that Alice can delay her choice of the bit to the last moment before the opening.

D. Quantum testers

A tester represents a quantum network starting with a state preparation and finishing with a measurement. When such a network is connected to a network of N quantum operations as in Fig. 5, the output is a measurement outcome i with probability p_i . In a bit commitment protocol, a dishonest Bob will perform a tester to distinguish Alice's strategies before the opening.




FIG. 5: Testing a network of N quantum operations $(\mathcal{E}_k)_{k=0}^{N-1}$. The tester consists in the preparation of an input state ρ_0 , followed by quantum operations $\{\mathcal{D}_1, \dots, \mathcal{D}_{N-1}\}$, and a final measurement $\{P_i\}$.

Mathematically, the tester is the collection of Choi-Jamiołkowski operators $\{T_i\}$ given by

$$T_i := P_i * D_{N-1} * \dots * D_1 * \rho_0, \quad (18)$$

where $(D_k)_{k=1}^{N-1}$ are the Choi-Jamiołkowski operators of the quantum operations $(\mathcal{D}_k)_{k=1}^{N-1}$ in Fig. 5. If the sum over all outcomes $T = \sum_i T_i$ is a deterministic comb, we call the tester *normalized*.

When the tester is connected to a quantum network R , the probability of the outcome i is

$$p_i = T_i * R = \text{Tr}[T_i^T R], \quad (19)$$

which is nothing but the Born rule, for quantum networks rather than states. Notice that one can include the transpose in the definition of the tester, thus getting the familiar form of the Born rule $p_i = \text{Tr}[T_i R]$. However, here we preferred to write probabilities in terms of the combs R and T_i of the measured and measuring networks, respectively, thus making explicit that the Born rule is nothing but a particular case of link product, the transpose appearing as the signature of the linking of two networks.

For a deterministic comb R and a normalized tester $\{T_i\}$ one has the normalization of the total probability:

$$\sum_i p_i = \sum_i \text{Tr}[T_i^T R] = 1. \quad (20)$$

In general, if one considers sub-normalized testers, one has

$$\sum_i p_i = \sum_i \text{Tr}[T_i^T R] = p \leq 1. \quad (21)$$

In the following we will call $T = \sum_i T_i$ *tester operator*.

Proposition 2 (Decomposition of testers [22]) *Let $T \in \text{Lin}(\mathcal{K})$, $\mathcal{K} = \bigotimes_{j=0}^{2N-1} \mathcal{H}_j$ be the tester operator of the quantum tester $\{T_i\}$. Let \mathcal{H}_B be the ancilla space $\mathcal{H}_B \simeq \text{Supp}(T) \subseteq \mathcal{K}$, and \tilde{T} be the dilation given by*

$$\tilde{T} = |T^{\frac{1}{2}}\rangle\rangle\langle\langle T^{\frac{1}{2}}| \in \text{Lin}(\mathcal{H} \otimes \mathcal{H}_B). \quad (22)$$

Then, one has the identity

$$\tilde{T} * R = [T^\tau]^{\frac{1}{2}} R [T^\tau]^{\frac{1}{2}}. \quad (23)$$

Moreover, the probabilities of outcomes $p_i = T_i * R$ are given by

$$p_i = P_i * \tilde{T} * R, \quad (24)$$

where $\{P_i\}$ is the POVM on \mathcal{H}_B defined by

$$P_i = T^{-\frac{1}{2}} T_i T^{-\frac{1}{2}}, \quad (25)$$

$T^{-1/2}$ being the inverse of $T^{1/2}$ on its support.

Proof. Checking Eq. (23) is immediate using Eq. (3)

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{T} * R &= \text{Tr}_{\mathcal{H}}[(R^\tau \otimes I_B)|T^{\frac{1}{2}}\rangle\rangle\langle\langle T^{\frac{1}{2}}|] \\ &= [T^\tau]^{\frac{1}{2}} R [T^\tau]^{\frac{1}{2}}. \end{aligned} \quad (26)$$

Regarding Eq. (24), one has $p_i = T_i * R = \text{Tr}[T_i^T R] = \text{Tr}[[T^\tau]^{\frac{1}{2}} P_i^T [T^\tau]^{\frac{1}{2}} R] = \text{Tr}[P_i^T (\tilde{T} * R)] = P_i * \tilde{T} * R$. ■

The interpretation of the above result is the following realization scheme for the tester $\{T_i\}$:

- realize the quantum network \tilde{T} and connect it with the measured network R
- conditionally on the given history of classical information corresponding to \tilde{T} , perform the POVM $\{P_i\}$ on the ancilla state $\rho = \tilde{T} * R$.

E. Discriminability of combs

Proposition 2 reduces any measurement on quantum network R to a measurement on a suitable (sub-normalized) state $\rho = \tilde{T} * R$, which is obtained by connecting the input comb R with a suitable comb \tilde{T} corresponding to the dilation of Eq. (22). In particular, it reduces the discrimination of two networks R_0 and R_1 to the discrimination of two output states

$$\rho_T^{(i)} = \tilde{T} * R_i = [T^\tau]^{\frac{1}{2}} R_i [T^\tau]^{\frac{1}{2}} \quad i = 0, 1. \quad (27)$$

This allows for the definition of an operational distance between networks [22], whose meaning is directly related to statistical discriminability

$$\begin{aligned} \|R_1 - R_0\|_{\text{op}} &:= \sup_T \|\rho_T^{(1)} - \rho_T^{(0)}\|_1 \\ &= \sup_T \|\tilde{T} * (R_1 - R_0)\|_1 \\ &= \sup_T \left\| [T^\tau]^{\frac{1}{2}} (R_1 - R_0) [T^\tau]^{\frac{1}{2}} \right\|_1, \end{aligned} \quad (28)$$

where the supremum is taken over the set of all tester operators $T = \sum_i T_i$, and $\|A\|_1 = \text{Tr}|A|$. Remarkably, the above norm can be strictly greater than the cb-norm of the difference $\mathcal{R}_1 - \mathcal{R}_0$ of the two multipartite channels [22], since a sequential scheme such as that in Fig. 5 can achieve a strictly better discrimination than a parallel scheme where a multipartite entangled state is fed in the unknown channel.

When the tester T and the combs R_i are probabilistic (namely correspond to networks of quantum operations) the states $\rho_T^{(i)} = \tilde{T} * R_i$ are generally sub-normalized, *i.e.* $\text{Tr}[\rho_T^{(i)}] \leq 1$. In this case, the sole fact that the sequences of quantum operations represented by \tilde{T} and R_i took place helps in discriminating between R_0 and R_1 . To be concrete, consider the scenario in which R_0 and R_1 have flat prior probabilities $\pi_0 = \pi_1 = 1/2$. The probability that the sequence of operations represented by \tilde{T} and R_i takes place is then given by $p(\tilde{T}, R_i) = \text{Tr}[\rho_T^{(i)}]/2$. Since this probability depends on i , upon knowing that the sequence of quantum operations \tilde{T} took place the initial flat prior must be updated to

$$\pi'_i = p(R_i|\tilde{T}) = \frac{p(\tilde{T}, R_i)}{p(\tilde{T})} = \frac{\text{Tr}[\rho_T^{(i)}]}{\text{Tr}[\rho_T^{(0)} + \rho_T^{(1)}]}. \quad (29)$$

The discrimination is now between the two conditional states $\bar{\rho}_T^{(i)} := \frac{\rho_T^{(i)}}{\text{Tr}[\rho_T^{(i)']}}$ with prior probability π'_i , $i = 0, 1$.

Therefore, the maximum success probability is given by

$$\begin{aligned} p_{succ} &= \frac{1}{2} \left(1 + \left\| \pi'_0 \bar{\rho}_T^{(0)} - \pi'_1 \bar{\rho}_T^{(1)} \right\|_1 \right) \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \left(1 + \frac{\left\| \rho_T^{(0)} - \rho_T^{(1)} \right\|_1}{\text{Tr}[\rho_T^{(0)} + \rho_T^{(1)}]} \right). \end{aligned} \quad (30)$$

Accordingly, we introduce the comb discriminability “distance”

$$\begin{aligned} d(R_1, R_0) &:= \sup'_T \frac{\left\| \rho_T^{(1)} - \rho_T^{(0)} \right\|_1}{\text{Tr}[\rho_T^{(1)} + \rho_T^{(0)}]} \\ &= \sup'_T \frac{\left\| \tilde{T} * (R_1 - R_0) \right\|_1}{\text{Tr}[\tilde{T} * (R_1 + R_0)]} \\ &= \sup'_T \frac{\left\| [T^\tau]^{\frac{1}{2}} (R_1 - R_0) [T^\tau]^{\frac{1}{2}} \right\|_1}{\text{Tr}[T^\tau (R_1 + R_0)]}, \end{aligned} \quad (31)$$

where \sup' (and consistently \inf') denotes the supremum (infimum) restricted to the tester operators T such that $\text{Tr}[T^\tau (R_0 + R_1)] > 0$. Here and in the following, we use the word “distance” informally, although for probabilistic combs the function d is just a semi-metric, namely the triangular inequality does not hold (*e.g.* consider the states $\rho = 1/2(|0\rangle\langle 0|)$, $\sigma = 1/2(|1\rangle\langle 1|)$, and $\tau = I/2$, for which $d(\rho, \sigma) > d(\rho, \tau) + d(\tau, \sigma)$).

1. Discriminability with a restricted set of testers

The comb distance quantifies the performances of the best scheme among all possible sequential schemes one can use to discriminate between two quantum networks. However, in a bit commitment protocol the set of schemes that Bob can actually use for discrimination may be limited by several factors. For example, Alice could perform random checks during the commitment phase in order to force Bob to use a quantum network that is close to the one prescribed by the honest strategy. We will therefore define optimal discrimination between R_0 and R_1 relatively to a restricted set \mathbb{T} of tester operators that can actually occur in the protocol, thus introducing the discriminability “distance”

$$\begin{aligned} d(R_1, R_0)|_{\mathbb{T}} &:= \sup'_{T \in \mathbb{T}} \frac{\left\| \rho_T^{(1)} - \rho_T^{(0)} \right\|_1}{\text{Tr}[\rho_T^{(1)} + \rho_T^{(0)}]} \\ &= \sup'_{T \in \mathbb{T}} \frac{\left\| [T^\tau]^{\frac{1}{2}} (R_1 - R_0) [T^\tau]^{\frac{1}{2}} \right\|_1}{\text{Tr}[T^\tau (R_1 + R_0)]}. \end{aligned} \quad (32)$$

The restriction of possible testers to a general set implies that the distance defined in Eq. (32) does not satisfy the property $d(x, y) = 0 \Rightarrow x = y$.

Lemma 1 *The discriminability distance in Eq. (32) is monotone under the application of a channel on the output spaces, namely*

$$d((\mathcal{C} \otimes \mathcal{I}_{in})R_1, (\mathcal{C} \otimes \mathcal{I}_{in})R_0)|_{\mathbb{T}} \leq d(R_1, R_0)|_{\mathbb{T}}. \quad (33)$$

Proof. Use monotonicity of trace-distance and the fact that the map \mathcal{C} is trace-preserving. ■

F. Continuity of dilation

We now prove that if two quantum combs R_0 and R_1 are close to each other then there exist two dilations \tilde{R}_0 and \tilde{R}_1 that are close with respect to the discriminability distance. Such continuity theorem replaces the Stinespring’s continuity theorem [27] used in the previous (C*-algebraic) impossibility proof of Ref. [3].

Lemma 2 (Continuity of dilation) *Let $R_0, R_1 \in \text{Lin}(\mathcal{K})$ be two quantum combs, $\tilde{R}_i = |R_i^{\frac{1}{2}}\rangle\rangle\langle\langle R_i^{\frac{1}{2}}| \in \text{Lin}(\mathcal{K} \otimes \mathcal{H}_A)$, $\mathcal{H}_A \simeq \mathcal{K}$ be two dilations, and $\mathbb{T} \subseteq \text{Lin}(\mathcal{K})$ be an arbitrary set of tester operators T . The following bound holds*

$$\inf_{\mathcal{P}} d\left(\tilde{R}_1, (\mathcal{I} \otimes \mathcal{P})(\tilde{R}_0)\right)\Big|_{\mathbb{T} \otimes I} \leq \sqrt{2} d(R_0, R_1)|_{\mathbb{T}} \quad (34)$$

where $\mathbb{T} \otimes I = \{T \otimes I | T \in \mathbb{T}\}$ and the infimum is taken over the set of random unitary channels $\mathcal{P}(\rho) = \sum_k p_k U_k \rho U_k^\dagger$ acting on the ancilla \mathcal{H}_A .

Proof. If we define

$$\tilde{\Delta}_{U_k} := \frac{\tilde{R}_1 - (I \otimes U_k) \tilde{R}_0 (I \otimes U_k^\dagger)}{\text{Tr}[(\tilde{R}_0 + \tilde{R}_1) * T]}, \quad (35)$$

we have

$$\inf_{\mathcal{P}} d\left(\tilde{R}_1, (\mathcal{I} \otimes \mathcal{P})(\tilde{R}_0)\right)\Big|_{\mathbb{T} \otimes I} = \inf_{\mathcal{P}} \sup'_{T \in \mathbb{T}} \left\| \sum_k p_k \tilde{T} * \tilde{\Delta}_{U_k} \right\|_1. \quad (36)$$

The triangle inequality for the trace-norm yields

$$\left\| \sum_k p_k \tilde{T} * \tilde{\Delta}_{U_k} \right\|_1 \leq \sum_k p_k \left\| \tilde{T} * \tilde{\Delta}_{U_k} \right\|_1. \quad (37)$$

Moreover, exploiting Eq. (23) we can write

$$\left\| \tilde{T} * \tilde{\Delta}_{U_k} \right\|_1 = \left\| \Psi_{T, I}^{(1)} - \Psi_{T, U_k}^{(0)} \right\|_1, \quad (38)$$

where $\Psi_{T, I}^{(0)}$ and $\Psi_{T, U_k}^{(1)}$ are defined by

$$\begin{aligned} \Psi_{T, C}^{(i)} &:= |\Psi_{T, C}^{(i)}\rangle\rangle\langle\langle \Psi_{T, C}^{(i)}| \\ |\Psi_{T, C}^{(i)}\rangle\rangle &:= \frac{([T^\tau]^{\frac{1}{2}} \otimes C) |R_i^{\frac{1}{2}}\rangle\rangle}{\sqrt{\text{Tr}[(R_0 + R_1) T^\tau]}}, \end{aligned} \quad (39)$$

for $C \in \text{Lin}(\mathcal{H}_A)$ any contraction. Using the bound

$$\begin{aligned} \|\psi\rangle\langle\psi| - |\varphi\rangle\langle\varphi|\|_1^2 &= (\|\psi\|^2 + \|\varphi\|^2)^2 - 4|\langle\psi|\varphi\rangle|^2 \\ &\leq (\|\psi\| + \|\varphi\|)^2(\|\psi\|^2 + \|\varphi\|^2 - 2|\langle\psi|\varphi\rangle|), \end{aligned} \quad (40)$$

which for $\|\psi\|^2 + \|\varphi\|^2 = 1$ becomes

$$\|\psi\rangle\langle\psi| - |\varphi\rangle\langle\varphi|\|_1^2 \leq 2(1 - 2|\langle\psi|\varphi\rangle|), \quad (41)$$

we obtain

$$\|\tilde{T} * \tilde{\Delta}_{U_k}\|_1 \leq \sqrt{2} \left(1 - 2|\langle\Psi_{T,I}^{(1)}|\Psi_{T,U_k}^{(0)}\rangle|\right)^{\frac{1}{2}}. \quad (42)$$

Then, by Jensen's inequality we have the following bound

$$\begin{aligned} &\sqrt{2} \inf_{\mathcal{P}} \sup'_{T \in \mathcal{T}} \sum_k p_k \left(1 - 2|\langle\Psi_{T,I}^{(1)}|\Psi_{T,U_k}^{(0)}\rangle|\right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \leq \\ &\sqrt{2} \inf_{\mathcal{P}} \sup'_{T \in \mathcal{T}} \left(1 - 2 \sum_k p_k |\langle\Psi_{T,I}^{(1)}|\Psi_{T,U_k}^{(0)}\rangle|\right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \leq \\ &\sqrt{2} \inf_{\mathcal{P}} \sup'_{T \in \mathcal{T}} \left(1 - 2 \left|\sum_k p_k \langle\Psi_{T,I}^{(1)}|\Psi_{T,U_k}^{(0)}\rangle\right|\right)^{\frac{1}{2}} = \\ &\sqrt{2} \inf_{\mathcal{P}} \sup'_{T \in \mathcal{T}} \left(1 - 2|\langle\Psi_{T,I}^{(1)}|\Psi_{T,C}^{(0)}\rangle|\right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \leq \\ &\sqrt{2} \inf_{\mathcal{P}} \sup'_{T \in \mathcal{T}} \left(1 - 2\text{Re}\langle\Psi_{T,I}^{(1)}|\Psi_{T,C}^{(0)}\rangle\right)^{\frac{1}{2}}, \end{aligned} \quad (43)$$

where C is the contraction $C = \sum_k p_k U_k$. Let us define by \mathbf{C} the compact convex set of all contractions $C = \sum_k p_k U_k$, and define the following function on $\mathbf{C} \times \mathcal{T}$

$$f(C, T) := \text{Re}\langle\Psi_{T,I}^{(1)}|\Psi_{T,C}^{(0)}\rangle, \quad (44)$$

In Appendix A we use Sion's minimax theorem of Ref. [28] to prove the identity

$$\inf'_{T \in \mathcal{T}} \sup_{C \in \mathbf{C}} f(C, T) = \sup_{C \in \mathbf{C}} \inf'_{T \in \mathcal{T}} f(C, T). \quad (45)$$

The chain of inequalities proved until now gives

$$\begin{aligned} \inf_{\mathcal{P}} d\left(\tilde{R}_1, (\mathcal{I} \otimes \mathcal{P})(\tilde{R}_0)\right)\Big|_{\mathcal{T}} &\leq \sqrt{2} \left(1 - 2 \sup_{C \in \mathbf{C}} \inf'_{T \in \mathcal{T}} f(C, T)\right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \\ &= \sqrt{2} \left(1 - 2 \inf'_{T \in \mathcal{T}} \sup_{C \in \mathbf{C}} f(C, T)\right)^{\frac{1}{2}} = \end{aligned} \quad (46)$$

$$\leq \sqrt{2} \left(1 - 2 \inf'_{T \in \mathcal{T}} \sup_U f(U, T)\right)^{\frac{1}{2}}, \quad (47)$$

where we substituted the supremum over contractions $C = \sum_k p_k U_k$ with the supremum over unitaries U , since the function $f(T, C)$ is linear in C . Moreover, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \sup_U f(T, U) &= \sup_U \text{Re}\langle\Psi_{T,I}^{(0)}|I \otimes U|\Psi_{T,I}^{(1)}\rangle \\ &= \sup_U \langle\Psi_{T,I}^{(0)}|I \otimes U|\Psi_{T,I}^{(1)}\rangle = \frac{F\left(\rho_T^{(1)}, \rho_T^{(0)}\right)}{\text{Tr}[\rho_T^{(1)} + \rho_T^{(0)}]}, \end{aligned} \quad (48)$$

where $\rho_T^{(i)}$ $i = 0, 1$ denote the unnormalized states $\rho_T^{(i)} := [T^\tau]^{\frac{1}{2}} R_i [T^\tau]^{\frac{1}{2}}$ and $F(\rho, \sigma) = \sup_U \text{Tr}[\rho^{\frac{1}{2}} U \sigma^{\frac{1}{2}}]$ is the Uhlmann fidelity. Finally, we can use the Bures-Alberti-Uhlmann bound

$$\text{Tr}[\rho + \sigma] - 2F(\rho, \sigma) \leq \|\rho - \sigma\|_1 \quad (49)$$

to obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \inf_{\mathcal{P}} d\left(\tilde{R}_1, (\mathcal{I} \otimes \mathcal{P})(\tilde{R}_0)\right)\Big|_{\mathcal{T}} &\leq \\ &\sqrt{2} \sup'_{T \in \mathcal{T}} \left(1 - 2 \frac{F\left(\rho_T^{(1)}, \rho_T^{(0)}\right)}{\text{Tr}[\rho_T^{(0)} + \rho_T^{(1)}]}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \\ &\leq \sup'_{T \in \mathcal{T}} \sqrt{\frac{2\|\rho_T^{(1)} - \rho_T^{(0)}\|_1}{\text{Tr}[\rho_T^{(0)} + \rho_T^{(1)}]}} = \sqrt{2} d(R_1, R_0)\Big|_{\mathcal{T}}. \end{aligned} \quad (51)$$

■

G. Conditional quantum combs

A general two party protocol entails the exchange of both quantum systems and of classical information, which is in principle openly known. Therefore, the strategy of a party will result in a sequence of quantum operations $\mathcal{C}_{i_{2k-1}}^{s_{2k-2}}$, $k = 1, 2, \dots, N$, as in Fig. 6. Here the index i_{2k-1} denotes the outcome of the quantum operation, and the string s_l represents the full history of classical information exchanged before the occurrence of the operation, namely $s_l = i_0 i_1 \dots i_l$, with i_{2k-2} representing the input classical information at step k . For example, if




FIG. 6: Sequence of quantum operations depending on previously exchanged classical information. Here i_{2k-1} is the outcome of the k -th quantum operation, and $s_l = i_0 i_1 \dots i_l$ is the history of classical information available at step l . The collection of all sequences corresponding to all possible classical histories is the conditional comb.

the comb in Fig. 6 represents Alice's strategy in a two-party protocol with Alice's and Bob's combs interlaced as in Fig. 2, it describes the following situation: Alice receives from Bob the classical information $i_0 \equiv s_0$ along with a quantum system with Hilbert space \mathcal{H}_{s_0} . Then she performs the instrument $\mathcal{I}^{s_0} = \{\mathcal{C}_j^{s_0}\}$ obtaining the outcome $j = i_1$. After that she sends to Bob the outcome along with a quantum system with Hilbert space

\mathcal{H}_{s_1} with $s_1 = i_0 i_1$. The normalization of the instrument is

$$\sum_{i_1} \text{Tr}_{\mathcal{H}_{s_1}} [\mathcal{C}_{i_1}^{s_0}(\rho)] = \text{Tr}[\rho], \quad \forall s_0, \forall \rho \in \text{Lin}(\mathcal{H}_{s_0}), \quad (52)$$

which, in terms of Choi-Jamiołkowski operators reads

$$\sum_{i_1} \text{Tr}_{\mathcal{H}_{s_1}} [C_{i_1}^{s_0}] = I_{s_0} \quad \forall s_0. \quad (53)$$

At the next step Alice receives from Bob the classical information i_2 along with a quantum system with Hilbert space \mathcal{H}_{s_2} , which depends on $s_2 = i_0 i_1 i_2$. Then she performs the instrument $\mathcal{I}^{s_2} = \{\mathcal{C}_j^{s_2}\}$ obtaining the outcome $j = i_3$, and so on. By linking the Choi-Jamiołkowski operators of all quantum operations, one obtains a family of probabilistic combs $\{R_{s_{2N-1}}\}$ satisfying the normalization conditions

$$\sum_{i_{2k-1}} \text{Tr}_{\mathcal{H}_{s_{2k-1}}} [R_{s_{2k-2} i_{2k-1}}^{(k)}] = I_{s_{2k-2}} \otimes R_{s_{2k-3}}^{(k-1)}, \quad (54)$$

where $R_{s_{2N-1}}^{(N)} := R_{s_{2N-1}}$, $R_{s_{2k-1}}^{(k)} \in \text{Lin}\left(\bigotimes_{j=0}^{2k-1} \mathcal{H}_{s_j}\right)$, and $R^{(0)} = 1$. Eq. (54) is the mathematical representation of the most general strategy in an N -round protocol with exchange of classical and quantum information, generalizing the game theoretical framework introduced by Gutoski and Watrous [21] for protocols involving only exchange of quantum systems. We will call the collection of probabilistic quantum combs satisfying Eq. (54) a *conditional comb*. This nomenclature reflects the fact that the most general way of conditioning a quantum comb needs to use at each step the information coming from all previous steps.

Eq. (54) sets a one-to-one correspondence between single-party strategies in a protocol and conditional combs: indeed, a collection of positive operators satisfying Eq. (54) can always be realized by a sequence of quantum instruments conditioned by classical information, as in Fig. (6). This fact is proved in the following proposition.

Theorem 2 *Any conditional comb is the collection of Choi-Jamiołkowski operators of a sequential network of N conditional instruments as in Fig. 6.*

Proof. Suppose that a collection of operators $\{R_{s_{2N-1}}\}$ labeled by classical strings $s_{2N-1} = i_0 i_1 \dots i_{2N-1}$ satisfies conditions Eq. (54). Then, we can define the operator

$$R := \sum_{s_{2N-1}} R_{s_{2N-1}} \otimes |s_{2N-1}\rangle\langle s_{2N-1}| \otimes |s_{2N-2}\rangle\langle s_{2N-2}| \otimes \dots \otimes |s_0\rangle\langle s_0|. \quad (55)$$

Here, R acts on the tensor product $\mathcal{K} := \bigotimes_{j=0}^{2N-1} \mathcal{H}_j$, where the j -th space is $\mathcal{H}_j := \left(\bigoplus_{s_j} \mathcal{H}_{s_j} \otimes |s_j\rangle\right)$. With this definition, R is a deterministic comb, i.e. an operator satisfying Eq. (8). Therefore, by Proposition 1 R

can be realized with a network of N channels $(\mathcal{C}_k)_{k=0}^{N-1}$ as in Fig. 4. Now, if we apply the von Neumann-Lüders measurements $\{|s_{2k}\rangle\langle s_{2k}|\}$ on the input space \mathcal{H}_{2k} before channel \mathcal{C}_k , followed by $\{|s_{2k+1}\rangle\langle s_{2k+1}|\}$ on the output space \mathcal{H}_{2k+1} after channel \mathcal{C}_k , we obtain the conditional quantum operations $\{\mathcal{C}_{i_{2k+1}}^{s_{2k}}\}$. Denoting by $C_{i_{2k+1}}^{s_{2k}}$ the Choi-Jamiołkowski operator of the quantum operation $\mathcal{C}_{i_{2k+1}}^{s_{2k}}$ we then have $R_{s_{2N-1}} = C_{i_{2N-1}}^{s_{2N-2}} * C_{i_{2N-3}}^{s_{2N-4}} * \dots * C_{i_1}^{s_0}$, i.e. $R_{s_{2N-1}}$ is the Choi-Jamiołkowski operator of the sequence of quantum operations $(\mathcal{C}_{i_{2k+1}}^{s_{2k}})_{k=0}^{N-1}$, as in Fig. 6. ■

In the following we will consider the *dilation of a conditional comb* $\{R_{s_{2N-1}}\}$ defined as the collection $\{\tilde{R}_{s_{2N-1}}\}$ of dilations $\tilde{R}_{s_{2N-1}} \in \text{Lin}\left(\left[\bigotimes_{j=0}^{2N-1} \mathcal{H}_{s_j}\right] \otimes \mathcal{H}_{A, s_{2N-1}}\right)$ of each comb $R_{s_{2N-1}} \in \text{Lin}\left(\bigotimes_{j=0}^{2N-1} \mathcal{H}_{s_j}\right)$, where $\mathcal{H}_{A, s_{2N-1}}$ is an ancillary space depending on history. The following theorem guarantees that the dilation of a conditional comb is still a conditional comb.

Theorem 3 *For any conditional comb $\{R_{s_{2N-1}}\}$ the dilation $\{\tilde{R}_{s_{2N-1}}\}$ defined by $\tilde{R}_{s_{2N-1}} := |R_{s_{2N-1}}^{\frac{1}{2}}\rangle\rangle\langle\langle R_{s_{2N-1}}^{\frac{1}{2}}|$ is a conditional comb.*

Proof. Define $\mathcal{H}'_{s_{2N-1}} := \mathcal{H}_{s_{2N-1}} \otimes \mathcal{H}_{A, s_{2N-1}}$ and $\mathcal{H}'_{s_l} = \mathcal{H}_{s_l}$ for $l < 2N - 1$. Then, the operators $\{\tilde{R}_{s_{2N-1}}\}$ form a conditional comb with $\tilde{R}_{s_{2N-1}} \in \text{Lin}\left(\bigotimes_{j=0}^{2N-1} \mathcal{H}'_{s_j}\right)$. ■

The dilation of a conditional comb describes as a sequence of single-Kraus quantum operations, each of them depending on the previously exchanged classical information. Loosely speaking, this theorem means that the “quantum part” of any strategy can be purified until the end of the protocol, still resulting in a valid strategy.

IV. COMB FORMULATION OF THE QUANTUM BIT COMMITMENT

A (generally multiparty) protocol establishes which are the honest single-party strategies. A strategy is a choice of processing of classical/quantum information at each step, and specifies which quantum instrument a party will perform jointly on his ancillae and on the received quantum systems, conditionally on the available classical information. The honest strategies of the protocol fix the communication interface among parties, consisting of the complete specification of which classical and quantum systems are exchanged at each step. A cheating strategy can be any strategy that conforms to the communication interface.

A definition of security of a protocol generally depends on the specific goals of the involved parties. For the quantum bit commitment a protocol is defined as perfectly secure if the following conditions are satisfied:

concealment: for all Alice's honest strategies Bob cannot read the committed bit before the opening;

bindingness: for all honest Bob's strategies Alice cannot change the value of the committed bit without being detected.

Note the asymmetry between the security condition for the two parties: on the one hand, security for Alice means that Bob has no chance at all to read the bit, while, on the other hand, security for Bob means that if Alice tries to cheat, she will be surely detected. Perfect security is relaxed to the case of ε -concealment and δ -bindingness, where the probability for Bob to read the committed bit is bounded by ε , and the probability for Alice to change the bit value is bounded by δ .

In the following subsections we will formulate strategies in terms of quantum combs, and evaluate the probabilities of successfully cheating for both parties.

A. Alice's and Bob's strategies

As already noticed, there is no loss of generality in considering bit commitment protocols started by Bob. With the letter $k = 1, \dots, N$ we will denote the k -th Bob's and Alice's step. Thus $s_l = i_0 i_1 \dots i_l$ will represent the history of classical information with i_{2k-1} denoting the outcome of Bob's quantum operation at step k (which is the same as Alice's classical input at Alice's step k) and i_{2k-2} for $k > 1$ represents Bob's input classical information (which is Alice's outcome at step $k-1$). At the beginning of the protocol there is no classical and quantum information, whence $s_0 = i_0$ is the null string and $\mathcal{H}_0 = \mathbb{C}$. At the end of the commitment stage we can assume without loss of generality that Alice performs the last move (for a protocol where the last move is Bob's, we can always add a null move, in which no classical and quantum systems are sent).

We now analyze the case in which the total number of steps in the protocol is bounded uniformly over all possible histories, and denote by N the maximum number of steps. Moreover, since we can always add null moves, we consider without loss of generality protocols where the number of steps is N independently of the history. Therefore the classical history labeling the sequence of quantum operations will be s_{2N} for Alice, and s_{2N-1} for Bob. Finally, by adding null steps we can decide without loss of generality that in the last move before the opening Alice performs just a local operation on her ancillae, *i.e.* she does not send to Bob any classical or quantum information. Accordingly, i_{2N} is the null string, and $\mathcal{H}_{s_{2N}} = \mathbb{C}$ for any history s_{2N} . Since both i_0 and i_{2N} are null strings, we have $s_{2N} \equiv s_{2N-1} \equiv i_1 i_2 \dots i_{2N-1}$.

We denote by \mathbf{A}_0 and \mathbf{A}_1 the sets of honest strategies that Alice can use to encode bit values 0 and 1, respectively. According to Subsect. III G, a possible strategy in \mathbf{A}_i is a conditional quantum comb $\{A_{i,s_{2N}}\}$, where the

index s_{2N} labels a history of classical information exchanged between Alice and Bob. For each history s_{2N} , $A_{i,s_{2N}}$ is a probabilistic comb on $\mathcal{K}_{s_{2N}} \otimes \mathcal{H}_{A,s_{2N}}$, where $\mathcal{K}_{s_{2N}} = \text{Lin} \left(\bigotimes_{j=1}^{2N} \mathcal{H}_{s_j} \right)$ is the Hilbert space of all quantum systems exchanged in the protocol and $\mathcal{H}_{A,s_{2N}}$ is the Hilbert space of Alice's private ancillae at the last step of the commitment phase.

We denote by \mathbf{B} the set of strategies (honest or not) that are available to Bob. The set \mathbf{B} can be the whole set of strategies compatible with the communication interface, or a restricted subset. The only assumption here is that if \mathbf{B} contains a strategy, then it contains also its dilations. The reader should then regard \mathbf{B} as a parameter of his own choice for the rest of the paper: the impossibility proof will state that if the protocol is concealing for a Bob restricted to \mathbf{B} , then it is necessarily not binding for Bob restricted to that subset. An element of \mathbf{B} is a collection of probabilistic quantum combs $\{B_{s_{2N-1}}\}$. For each history s_{2N-1} , $B_{s_{2N-1}}$ is a comb on $\mathcal{K}_{s_{2N-1}} \otimes \mathcal{H}_{B,s_{2N-1}}$, where $\mathcal{K}_{s_{2N-1}} := \bigotimes_{j=0}^{2N-1} \mathcal{H}_{s_j}$, and $\mathcal{H}_{B,s_{2N-1}}$ is the Hilbert space of Bob's ancillae at the last step of the commitment phase. Note that, since $\mathcal{H}_{s_0} = \mathcal{H}_{s_{2N}} = \mathbb{C}$, one has $\mathcal{K}_{s_{2N}} \simeq \mathcal{K}_{s_{2N-1}} \simeq \bigotimes_{j=1}^{2N-1} \mathcal{H}_{s_j}$.

In the following we focus on the last step N before the opening. Since the step is fixed, we will drop the sub-index $2N$ ($2N-1$) labeling Alice's (Bob's) history. For the history s , the overall (unnormalized) state resulting from Alice and Bob playing the strategies $\{A_{i,s'}\}$ and $\{B_{s'}\}$, respectively, is given by the link product

$$\sigma_s^{(i)} = B_s * A_{i,s} \in \text{Lin}(\mathcal{H}_{A,s} \otimes \mathcal{H}_{B,s}). \quad (56)$$

The probability of the history s is then given by the trace

$$p_s^{(i)} = \text{Tr}[\sigma_s^{(i)}] \quad (57)$$

The local state at Bob before the opening is

$$\rho_s^{(i)} = \text{Tr}_{\mathcal{H}_{A,s}}[\sigma_s^{(i)}] = B_s * R_{i,s}, \quad (58)$$

where

$$R_{i,s} = \text{Tr}_{\mathcal{H}_{A,s}}[A_{i,s}] \in \text{Lin}(\mathcal{K}_s). \quad (59)$$

is the restriction of Alice's comb to the quantum systems exchanged in the protocol.

B. Concealing protocols

Definition 1 (Concealing protocols) *A quantum bit commitment protocol is ε -concealing if there is at least a couple of honest strategies $\{A_{0,s'}\} \in \mathbf{A}_0$, $\{A_{1,s'}\} \in \mathbf{A}_1$ such that the following conditions hold:*

$$\max_s \frac{\left\| \rho_s^{(1)} - \rho_s^{(0)} \right\|_1}{\text{Tr} \left[\rho_s^{(1)} + \rho_s^{(0)} \right]} \leq \varepsilon, \quad \forall \{B_{s'}\} \in \mathbf{B} \quad (60)$$

where $\rho_s^{(i)}$ is the unnormalized state on Bob's side $\rho_s^{(i)} = B_s * R_{i,s}$, with $R_{i,s} = \text{Tr}_{\mathcal{H}_{A,s}}[A_{i,s}]$.

As discussed in subsection III E, the the above condition means that, for any history of classical communication, the probability that Bob discriminates correctly between $R_{0,s}$ and $R_{1,s}$ is ε -close to $1/2$, the success probability of a random guess.

The concealment condition can be translated in terms of combs distances as follows:

Lemma 3 *A protocol is ε -concealing if and only if there is a couple of honest strategies $\{A_{0,s'}\}$ and $\{A_{1,s'}\}$ such that*

$$\max_s d(R_{1,s}, R_{0,s})|_{\mathbb{T}_s} \leq \varepsilon. \quad (61)$$

where $\mathbb{T}_s = \{T_s := \text{Tr}_{\mathcal{H}_{B,s}}[B_s], B_s \in \{B_{s'}\} \in \mathbb{B}\}$.

Proof. Clearly, condition (60) holds if and only if

$$\max_s \sup_{\mathbb{B}_s} \frac{\|\rho_s^{(1)} - \rho_s^{(0)}\|_1}{\text{Tr}[\rho_s^{(1)} + \rho_s^{(0)}]} \leq \varepsilon, \quad (62)$$

where $\mathbb{B}_s = \{B_s \in \{B_{s'}\} \in \mathbb{B}\}$. Moreover, since the set of Bob's strategies is closed under dilation, and since dilation improves the discrimination, the supremum can be taken over the dilations $\{\tilde{B}_{s'}\}$. Now, denote by \tilde{T}_s the dilation of $T_s = \text{Tr}_{\mathcal{H}_{B,s}}[B_s]$. Since \tilde{B}_s and \tilde{T}_s are both dilations of T_s , they are connected by a partial isometry on Bob's ancillae. The same is true for the states $\tilde{\rho}_s^{(i)} := \tilde{B}_s * R_{i,s}$, and $\rho_{T_s}^{(i)} := \tilde{T}_s * R_{i,s}$, for each value $i = 0, 1$, whence $\|\tilde{\rho}_s^{(0)} - \tilde{\rho}_s^{(1)}\|_1 = \|\rho_{T_s}^{(0)} - \rho_{T_s}^{(1)}\|_1$. This implies the identity

$$\begin{aligned} \max_s \sup_{\mathbb{B}_s} \frac{\|\rho_s^{(1)} - \rho_s^{(0)}\|_1}{\text{Tr}[\rho_s^{(1)} + \rho_s^{(0)}]} &= \max_s \sup_{\mathbb{B}_s} \frac{\|\tilde{\rho}_s^{(1)} - \tilde{\rho}_s^{(0)}\|_1}{\text{Tr}[\tilde{\rho}_s^{(1)} + \tilde{\rho}_s^{(0)}]} \\ &= \max_s \sup_{\mathbb{T}_s} \frac{\|\rho_{T_s}^{(1)} - \rho_{T_s}^{(0)}\|_1}{\text{Tr}[\rho_{T_s}^{(1)} + \rho_{T_s}^{(0)}]} \\ &= \max_s d(R_{1,s}, R_{0,s})|_{\mathbb{T}_s}. \end{aligned} \quad (63)$$

■

C. Alice's cheating strategies

Let $\{A_{s'}\}$ and $\{A_{s'}^\sharp\}$ be a honest and a dishonest strategy by Alice, respectively (here we drop the index $i = 0, 1$ of the bit value, since it is unnecessary for the following discussion). When Bob chooses the strategy $\{B_{s'}\} \in \mathbb{B}$, for history s the unnormalized quantum states before the opening phase are

$$\sigma_s = B_s * A_s, \quad \sigma_s^\sharp = B_s * A_s^\sharp. \quad (64)$$

Definition 2 *The strategy $\{A_{s'}^\sharp\}$ is δ -close to the strategy $\{A_{s'}\}$ at the opening if for any strategy $\{B_{s'}\} \in \mathbb{B}$ one has*

$$\max_s \frac{\|\sigma_s - \sigma_s^\sharp\|_1}{\text{Tr}[\sigma_s + \sigma_s^\sharp]} \leq \delta. \quad (65)$$

If two strategies are δ -close, Bob cannot distinguish between them, even if the history that takes place is the most favorable to him.

Following the same argument used in the proof of lemma 3, the notion of δ -closeness can be expressed in terms of comb distance as follows:

Lemma 4 *The strategy $\{A_{s'}^\sharp\}$ is δ -close to the strategy $\{A_{s'}\}$ at the opening if and only if*

$$\max_s d(A_s, A_s^\sharp)|_{\mathbb{T}_s \otimes I_{A,s}} \leq \delta, \quad (66)$$

where $\mathbb{T}_s \otimes I_{A,s} = \{T_s \otimes I_{A,s} | T_s = \text{Tr}_{\mathcal{H}_{B,s}}[B_s], B_s \in \{B_{s'}\} \in \mathbb{B}\}$ and $I_{A,s}$ denotes the identity on Alice's ancilla $\mathcal{H}_{A,s}$.

Definition 3 *Given two honest strategies $\{A_{0,s'}\} \in \mathbb{A}_0$ and $\{A_{1,s'}\} \in \mathbb{A}_1$, a δ -cheating is a couple of strategies $\{A_{0,s'}^\sharp\}$ and $\{A_{1,s'}^\sharp\}$ satisfying the conditions*

1. $\{A_{i,s'}^\sharp\}$ is δ -close to $\{A_{i,s'}\}$ for $i = 0, 1$
2. for every history s , there exists a quantum channel \mathcal{C}_s acting on Alice's ancilla space $\mathcal{H}_{A,s}$ such that

$$A_{1,s}^\sharp = (\mathcal{I}_s \otimes \mathcal{C}_s)(A_{0,s}^\sharp), \quad (67)$$

where \mathcal{I}_s is the identity channel on the Hilbert space \mathcal{K}_s of all quantum systems exchanged in the commitment phase.

The second condition means that Alice can follow the strategy $\{A_{0,s'}^\sharp\}$ until the end of the commitment, and switch to the strategy $\{A_{1,s'}^\sharp\}$ with a local operation on her ancillae just before the opening.

V. THE IMPOSSIBILITY PROOF

A. Protocols with bounded number of rounds

Theorem 4 *If an N -round protocol is ε -concealing with honest strategies $\{A_{0,s}\} \in \mathbb{A}_0$ and $\{A_{1,s}\} \in \mathbb{A}_1$, then there is a $\sqrt{2\varepsilon}$ -cheating with cheating strategies $\{A_{0,s}^\sharp\}$ and $\{A_{1,s}^\sharp\}$. In particular, the cheating strategy $\{A_{0,s}^\sharp\}$ coincides with the honest strategy $\{A_{0,s}\}$.*

Proof. According to Eq. (61), the concealing condition is for any history s

$$d(R_{1,s}, R_{0,s})|_{\mathbb{T}_s} < \varepsilon, \quad (68)$$

where $R_{i,s} = \text{Tr}_{\mathcal{H}_{A,s}}[A_{i,s}]$ and $\mathsf{T}_s = \{T_s = \text{Tr}_{\mathcal{H}_{B,s}}[B_s] \mid B_s \in \{B_{s'}\} \in \mathsf{B}\}$. We now focus on a fixed history s , and show the existence of two $\sqrt{2\varepsilon}$ -cheating strategies $\{A_{0,s'}^\sharp\}$ and $\{A_{1,s'}^\sharp\}$. Since we are fixing s , we drop the index s everywhere.

Since the reduced combs $R_i = \text{Tr}_{\mathcal{H}_A}[A_i] \in \text{Lin}(\mathcal{K})$ satisfy the condition $d(R_1, R_0)|_{\mathsf{T}} < \varepsilon$, we can use the continuity of dilation stated by Lemma 2, thus finding a random unitary channel $\mathcal{P} = \sum_k p_k \mathcal{U}_k$ acting on the ancilla space $\mathcal{H}_A \simeq \mathcal{K}$ such that

$$d(\tilde{R}_1, (\mathcal{I} \otimes \mathcal{P})\tilde{R}_0) \Big|_{\mathsf{T} \otimes I_A} \leq \sqrt{2} d(R_1, R_0)|_{\mathsf{T}}, \quad (69)$$

where \tilde{R}_i is the dilation $\tilde{R}_i = |R_i^{\frac{1}{2}}\rangle\rangle\langle\langle R_i^{\frac{1}{2}}| \in \text{Lin}(\mathcal{K} \otimes \mathcal{K}_A)$. Now consider the dilations of the honest strategies

$$\tilde{A}_i := |A_i^{\frac{1}{2}}\rangle\rangle\langle\langle A_i^{\frac{1}{2}}|. \quad (70)$$

Here \tilde{A}_i is an operator in $\text{Lin}(\mathcal{K} \otimes \mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{L}_A)$ where $\mathcal{L}_A \simeq \mathcal{K} \otimes \mathcal{H}_A$ is an additional ancilla space on Alice's side. By definition, $R_i = \text{Tr}_{\mathcal{H}_A, \mathcal{L}_A}[\tilde{A}_i]$. Since \tilde{A}_i and \tilde{R}_i are both dilations of R_i , there exist a channel \mathcal{E}_i sending states on $(\mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{L}_A)$ to states on \mathcal{K}_A such that

$$\tilde{R}_i = (\mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{K}} \otimes \mathcal{E}_i)(\tilde{A}_i), \quad (71)$$

and a channel \mathcal{F}_i sending states on \mathcal{K}_A to states on $(\mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{L}_A)$ such that

$$\tilde{A}_i = (\mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{K}} \otimes \mathcal{F}_i)(\tilde{R}_i). \quad (72)$$

Alice's cheating procedure is then the following:

- Use the dilated strategy \tilde{A}_0
- After the commitment decide the bit value. To commit 0, do nothing. To commit 1, apply the channel $\mathcal{C} = \mathcal{F}_1 \mathcal{P} \mathcal{E}_0$ on the ancillae, where $\mathcal{P}(\rho) = \sum_i p_i U_i \rho U_i^\dagger$.
- Discard the additional ancilla \mathcal{L}_A .

This procedure defines for every history s the two cheating strategies $\{A_{0,s'}^\sharp\} := \{A_{0,s'}\}$ and $\{A_{1,s'}^\sharp\} := \{(\mathcal{I}_{s'} \otimes \mathcal{C}_{s'}) (A_{0,s'}^\sharp)\}$. Clearly, $\{A_{0,s'}^\sharp\}$ is $\sqrt{2\varepsilon}$ -close to $\{A_{0,s'}\}$ (in fact, they coincide). Regarding $\{A_{1,s'}^\sharp\}$, for any history s (and hence dropping the index) we have

$$\begin{aligned} d(A_1, A_1^\sharp) \Big|_{\mathsf{T} \otimes I_A} &= d\left(A_1, \text{Tr}_{\mathcal{L}_A} \left[(\mathcal{I} \otimes \mathcal{F}_1 \mathcal{P} \mathcal{E}_0)(\tilde{A}_0) \right] \Big|_{\mathsf{T} \otimes I_A}\right) \\ &\leq d\left(\tilde{A}_1, (\mathcal{I} \otimes \mathcal{F}_1 \mathcal{P} \mathcal{E}_0)(\tilde{A}_0) \Big|_{\mathsf{T} \otimes I_A}\right) \\ &= d\left((\mathcal{I} \otimes \mathcal{F}_1)(\tilde{R}_1), (\mathcal{I} \otimes \mathcal{F}_1 \mathcal{P})(\tilde{R}_0) \Big|_{\mathsf{T} \otimes I_A}\right) \\ &\leq d\left(\tilde{R}_1, (\mathcal{I} \otimes \mathcal{P})(\tilde{R}_0) \Big|_{\mathsf{T} \otimes I_A}\right) \\ &\leq \sqrt{2} d(R_1, R_0)|_{\mathsf{T}} \leq \sqrt{2\varepsilon}. \end{aligned} \quad (73)$$

Here, the first and the second inequalities derive from Lemma 1, the third one is Eq. (69), and the last is the concealing condition. ■

B. Protocols with unbounded number or rounds

Here we show how the impossibility result of the previous subsection can be easily extended to the case of protocols where the number of rounds is unbounded. In this case Alice's (Bob's) strategies are still described by collections of probabilistic combs $\{A_{s'}\}$ and $(\{B'_s\})$, where each probabilistic comb represents the sequence of quantum operations performed by Alice (Bob) for a given history s of classical communication. Note that, although the length the strings is no longer bounded by a fixed number, any given string s must have finite length. Indeed, a protocol allowing an infinitely long history s would be a protocol in which sometimes Alice and Bob have to continue their communication forever, without reaching neither a successful commitment, nor an abort.

For a protocol with unbounded number of rounds, the conditions of ε -concealment and δ -closeness are still given by Eqs. (60) and (65), respectively. Now, it is immediate to see that, given an ε -concealing protocol with unbounded number of rounds, one can always construct a new ε -concealing protocol with bounded number. Indeed, Alice can follow the original unbounded protocol, and decide to abort whenever the number of rounds exceeds a fixed number N . This change does not change the security of the protocol: it just reduces the probability of successful commitment by turning some histories that in the original protocol ended in a successful commitment into histories that end in an abort. For the new protocol with finite rounds, however, one can apply theorem 4, thus finding a $\sqrt{2\varepsilon}$ -cheating for Alice. Since N is arbitrary and since for any N the cheating strategy coincides with the honest one up to the opening, Alice can take the number N to be sufficiently large to make the probability of successful commitment close to the one of the unbounded original protocol.

VI. SUMMARY

In this paper we have provided a new short impossibility proof of quantum bit commitment. The present proof differs from the previous ones in the following main aspects: *a)* The strategies, including all their ‘‘purifications’’, have a simple and univocal mathematical representation in terms of conditional quantum combs in Eq. (54); *b)* The definition of concealment and bindingness are worst-case over histories, namely the conditions on cheating probabilities are defined uniformly over histories of classical communication rather than on average; *c)* we consider the possibility of restricting the strategies of Bob to an arbitrary set closed under dilation, and

show that if the protocol is concealing for Bob restricted in this way, then it is not binding. Along similar lines it is possible to prove the impossibility theorem also with cheating probabilities averaged over histories. However, the two impossibility theorems are not comparable, since worst-case concealment implies concealment in average, whereas bindingness in average implies worst-case bindingness.

At the end of the paper, we want to stress two points regarding abortion probabilities. First, concealment is defined regardless abortion, namely Bob must not be able to detect the bit value anyway, whether Alice catches him or not. Second, in order to cheat Alice has only to play the honest strategy $\{A_{0,s'}\}$ up to the very last moment before the opening, at which point her cheat is anyway undetectable by Bob (at the opening Bob's success probability in detecting the cheat is at most $\sqrt{2\varepsilon}$ -close to the success probability of a random guess). Therefore, the probability of abort before the opening is independent on whether Alice is cheating or not.

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APPENDIX A: PROOF OF MINIMAX EQUALITY IN EQ. (45)

Lemma 5 *Let f be the function from $\mathbb{C} \times \mathbb{T}$ to \mathbb{R} :*

$$f(C, T) = \text{Re} \langle \langle \Psi_{T,I}^{(1)} | \Psi_{T,C}^{(0)} \rangle \rangle \quad (\text{A1})$$

$$\langle \langle \Psi_{T,I}^{(1)} | \Psi_{T,C}^{(0)} \rangle \rangle = \frac{\langle \langle R_1^{\frac{1}{2}} | T^\tau \otimes C | R_0^{\frac{1}{2}} \rangle \rangle}{\text{Tr}[T^\tau (R_0 + R_1)]} \quad (\text{A2})$$

where $R_i \geq 0$. Then one has the identity

$$\inf_{T \in \mathbb{T}}' \sup_{C \in \mathbb{C}} f(C, T) = \sup_{C \in \mathbb{C}} \inf_{T \in \mathbb{T}}' f(C, T), \quad (\text{A3})$$

where the infimum over T is taken over the set of tester operators $T \in \mathbb{T}$ such that $\text{Tr}[T^\tau (R_0 + R_1)] \neq 0$.

Proof. Let $\bar{\mathbb{T}}$ be the closure of the convex hull of \mathbb{T} . Since we are in finite dimensions, $\bar{\mathbb{T}}$ is a compact set. Define the compact convex set \mathbb{T}_n as

$$\mathbb{T}_n := \left\{ T \in \bar{\mathbb{T}} \mid \text{Tr}[T^\tau (R_0 + R_1)] \geq \frac{1}{n} \right\}. \quad (\text{A4})$$

We now restrict f to the set \mathbb{T}_n and apply Sion's minimax theorem [28]. The hypotheses of the theorem are

satisfied: First, the function is continuous versus C and T , and both sets \mathbb{C} and \mathbb{T}_n are compact and convex. Finally, the function f , being linear-fractional, is *quasi-linear* in T for every C [29], whereas it is linear in C for every T in its domain. For arbitrary n , Sion's theorem [28] yields the equality

$$\inf_{T \in \mathbb{T}_n} \sup_{C \in \mathbb{C}} f(C, T) = \sup_{C \in \mathbb{C}} \inf_{T \in \mathbb{T}_n} f(C, T) \quad (\text{A5})$$

Moreover, the function $g(T) := \sup_{C \in \mathbb{C}} f(C, T)$ is quasi-concave, since it is the supremum over one variable of a jointly quasi-concave function of (C, T) [29]. Therefore, the infimum of g over \mathbb{T} is equal to the infimum over the closed convex hull $\bar{\mathbb{T}}$, and we have

$$\begin{aligned} \inf_{T \in \mathbb{T}}' \sup_{C \in \mathbb{C}} f(C, T) &= \inf_{T \in \mathbb{T}}' g(T) = \inf_{T \in \bar{\mathbb{T}}} g(T) \\ &= \inf_{T \in \bar{\mathbb{T}}} \sup_{C \in \mathbb{C}} f(C, T) = \inf_n \inf_{T \in \mathbb{T}_n} \sup_{C \in \mathbb{C}} f(C, T) \\ &= \inf_n \sup_{C \in \mathbb{C}} \inf_{T \in \mathbb{T}_n} f(C, T) \geq \sup_{C \in \mathbb{C}} \inf_{T \in \bar{\mathbb{T}}} f(C, T) \\ &= \sup_{C \in \mathbb{C}} \inf_{T \in \mathbb{T}}' f(C, T), \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A6})$$

having used that $f(C, T)$ is quasi-concave in T for any C , whence the infimum over $\bar{\mathbb{T}}$ is equal to the infimum over \mathbb{T} . In fact, the above bound is achieved: For any $\varepsilon > 0$, and for any $C \in \mathbb{C}$, there is an element $T_C \in \mathbb{T}$ such that $f(C, T_C) \leq \inf_{T \in \mathbb{T}} f(C, T) + \varepsilon/2$. Moreover, since f is continuous in its domain, there exist two open sets $A_C \subseteq \mathbb{C}$ and $B_{T_C} \subseteq \mathbb{T}$ such that for $C' \in A_C$ and $T' \in B_{T_C}$ one has $f(C', T') \leq f(C, T_C) + \varepsilon/2$. Now, the open sets $\{A_C\}$ form an open cover of \mathbb{C} . Since \mathbb{C} is compact, one can extract from $\{A_C\}$ a finite subcover $\{A_{C_i}\}$. Finally, for any i there is a number n_i such that the intersection between $B_{T_{C_i}}$ and \mathbb{T}_{n_i} is non empty. Let us define $n_\varepsilon = \max\{n_i\}$. Then we have

$$\begin{aligned} \sup_{C \in A_{C_i}} \inf_{T \in \mathbb{T}_{n_\varepsilon}} f(C, T) &\leq \sup_{C \in A_{C_i}} \inf_{T \in T_{n_\varepsilon} \cap B_{T_i}} f(C, T) \\ &\leq f(C_i, T_{C_i}) + \varepsilon/2 \leq \inf_{T \in \mathbb{T}} f(C_i, T) + \varepsilon \\ &\leq \sup_C \inf_{T \in \mathbb{T}}' f(C, T) + \varepsilon. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A7})$$

Since the sets $\{A_{C_i}\}$ cover \mathbb{C} , this implies $\sup_{C \in \mathbb{C}} \inf_{T \in \mathbb{T}_{n_\varepsilon}} (f(C, T)) \leq \sup_{C \in \mathbb{C}} \inf_{T \in \mathbb{T}} f(C, T) + \varepsilon$, whence

$$\begin{aligned} \inf_{T \in \mathbb{T}}' \sup_{C \in \mathbb{C}} f(C, T) &= \inf_n \sup_{C \in \mathbb{C}} \inf_{T \in \mathbb{T}_n} f(C, T) \\ &\leq \sup_{C \in \mathbb{C}} \inf_{T \in \mathbb{T}}' f(C, T) + \varepsilon. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A8})$$

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